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ALABAMA'S PROCEDURAL REFORM
AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT
By CHARLES E. CLARK'
The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, prepared by the
Commission for Judicial Reform for legislative approval this
spring, represent at once a highly competent professional
achievement and a splendid augury for sound procedural ad-
vance in this important state. I do not recall anywhere a
smoother adaptation of the popular federal practice to local
needs than is found here. I count it a privilege to express my
warm approval of the measure and my conviction that its passage
will put Alabama in the forefront of procedural progress in this
country. As it happens, this will fulfill a hope and a prophecy I
expressed many years ago. When the federal rules were first
formulated, I spoke to lawyers in many cities explaining as Re-
porter to the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee the details
of the reform and my own expectation and belief that the same
reform would shortly be adopted in the states I visited. So I
came to Birmingham in the fall of 1938 after visits to Louisville
and Knoxville and prior to visits to Atlanta and New Orleans.,
It has taken almost two decades to realize the objective I visual-
ized, but I am confident that it will now prove just as durable
a move here as it has elsewhere. Not a jurisdiction adopting the
modern procedure has ever wanted to return to the past; indeed,
nowhere has there been a demand of even sizable character to
that end.
Since your proposed plan is so identically the procedure
which I have long endorsed, I do not find occasion to discuss
it here in detail. Your skilled draftsmen have shown so
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; formerly.Re-
porter to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court
of the United States and Dean of the Yale Law School.
1 This followed after "institutes" held at Cleveland, Washington, and New York.
See PROCEEDINGS OF INSTTUTE, CLEVELAND, 194-277 (1938); PROCEEDINGS OF INsrrrTuTm,
WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, 39-80, 235-248 (1938); Clark, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 86 Prrrsn. LEG. J. 4-8, 27-68 (1938); Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by
the New Federal Rules, 15 TE\-. L. REV. 551-569, 579-585 (1939).
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thorough a knowledge that further instruction would be carry-
ing coals to Newcastle. Rather I prefer, as your proposed sym-
posium indicates, to relate this proposal to the general move-
ment for procedural reform with which it is so intimately con-
nected. In so doing I shall, I believe, give added basis for the
professional satisfaction you all must feel as Alabama assumes
leadership in this great cause, the most important affecting our
courts today.
It is now a matter of history that the movement which cul-
minated in the federal rules was a long time in getting off the
ground. As early as 1886, David Dudley Field, the father of
Code Pleading, was calling for federal reform. The American
Bar Association got into the program actively in 1912 with a
committee appointed to strive for Uniform Judicial Procedure,
and the union of law and equity was added as a goal in 1922.
It gave up the struggle in 1932 and 1933 only to see Attorney
General Cummings obtain the passage of the rule-making act
by sound and tried political methods on June 19, 1934. The
Supreme Court appointed its Advisory Committee in May 1935
and the Committee made its final report and recommendations
in the fall of 1937. The Court then adopted the rules and re-
ported them to Congress, as required by the governing statute,
so that they became effective throughout the far-flung federal
court system on September 16, 1938.2 That so complete and
carefully supported a system could have been thus so quickly
prepared, executed, and put into effect is due in large measure
to the executive skill and driving force of the Committee's
Chairman, former Attorney General William D. Mitchell, whose
services to American procedural reform have been too little
appreciated. The fact that the system went into operation so
smoothly I attribute in part to Mr. Mitchell's original concep-
tion, rigorously carried out, that rules should be adopted only
2 The history of this background with references to the voluminous literature is
given in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 31-41 (2d ed. 1947).
3.There is no adequate statement anywhere of the debt owed by the profession
to this one man. I have a slight reference in Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure,
17 OHIO ST. L. J. 163 (1956), and in Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Re.
forA, 13 LAw s- CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 148 (1948), and did speak (all too summarily)
in an unpublished letter to the Chief Justice announcing his death in August 1955.
A measure of his initial contribution is shown in his persuasive letter to the Court
in 1935 which ensured the union of law and equity, at length published, on my
urging, in Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DAvw DUDLEY FIELD CEN-
TENARY ESSAYs 73, 76-78 (1949). I hope that sometime adequate honor may be done
to this unique contribution to the administration of justice in this country.
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after the fullest examination of them by the bench and bar,
with careful consideration by the Advisory Committee given to
all criticisms and suggestions. That the federal procedure has
likewise proved so successful in two decades of operation is due,
in my humble judgment, to the wisdom of its underlying plan.
The success of the procedure has been attested both within
federal courts and without. Federal practice formerly was so
strange and ill assimilated a combination of state, legal, equity,
and mixed principles that it became the most feared and in-
volved of all procedures-a matter entirely for specialists.4
Practically overnight a new system took effect with which
lawyers felt at home and yet one where mistakes were not sub-
ject to dire penalties. Both lawyers and judges took to the new
rules with surprisingly little resistance from a profession so
traditionally rooted in the past. Many judges have remarked
on the new aroused interest in simple law administration, which
took hold of both lawyers and judges. Indeed, I count it one
of the most satisfying consequences that many judges and
lawyers wanted to be and did become procedural experts, not
as mere technicians, but as regular protagonists of simplified
procedure. It was literally true that everyone wanted to and
was able to get into the act!5
Nor has that spirit worn off after the span of two decades.
That is shown by the strength of the movement and its hold
upon state reform. Roughly a dozen important jurisdictions have
followed the federal example and adopted all of the federal
rules; another dozen states have adopted substantial areas of the
new procedure; somewhat lesser segments of the rules appear in
half a dozen more states; while occasional rules, such as that on
pre-trial, have found a home in nearly all the states. Even more
important, no new proposition for reform appears now but
4 Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-. The Background, 44 YALE
L.J. 387 (1935); Jaffin; Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. REv. 504 (1935); Tol-
man, The Origin of the Conformity Idea, Its Development, the Failure of the Experi-
ment, etc., 23 A.B.A.J. 971 (1937).
G This is discussed with citations in, e.g., Clark, The Influence of Federal Pro-
ccdural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 144 (1948); Clark, The Federal Rules in
State Practice, 23 RocKY MT. L. REV. 520 (1951). See Chesnut, Improvements in Ju-
dicial Procedure, 17 CONN. B. J. 238, 243 (1943): "I have yet to note an instance in
which they [the rules] have been found lacking." And see VANDERBiLT, THE CHAL-
LENGE or LAW REFORMi 55-67 (1955) and several articles by Judge Holtzoff, of which
the latest is Holtzoff, Judicial Procedure Reform: The Leadership of the Supreme
Court. 43 A.B.A.J. 215 (1957); and see Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1955).
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that the federal system is at least its point of departure. More-
over, in states with piecemeal reforms the failure to take over
the system in its entirety is usually a matter of regret on the part
of the profession, which later seeks steadily to repair the gaps.
The adoption of the modern rules now proposed for Alabama
is the fundamental step in court reform in this country, com-
parable to the early spread of code pleading after the adoption
of the original David Dudley Field Code in New York in 1848.
Indeed, in view of the adoption of the modern rules in the en-
tire federal court system and so many leading states, the success
of the movement seems at least as complete and pervasive as
that of the earlier movement to adopt code pleading, although
it may be less heralded, since in the majority of states the most
spectacular step of uniting law and equity was already accom-
plished under the codesY
Two of the less obvious reasons for this professional ac-
ceptance of the new system are, I think, worthy of careful note:
first, a selective retention of the best in all existing procedures,
instead of an attempt at complete innovation; and second, care-
ful exploitation of the principle that the purpose of procedure
was knowledge or disclosure to all-with no bonus for tricks
of concealment and no horror of "fishing expeditions" so de-
nounced of old. What is really new about the system is the
whole, not the parts. Your Professor Morgan well describes
this as "pouring old wine into fewer bottles. ' '7 Practically all
the new rules were already in successful use in some states or in
the federal equity practice or in the English procedure. That
is why lawyers have such a sense of pleasant surprise in recog-
nizing so much of what they are accustomed to in the new sys-
tem. (True, they happily overlook the demise of local techni-
calities now gone and forgotten.) I find I was stressing this
feature when I went on tour back in 1938;' but I think it cannot
&The success in the states to date is ably documented in the excellent and in-
formative Report by Chairman Skinner, FINAL DRAFr ALA. RULES CIv. PROC. 1-20
(1957). A late addition is N. D. RuLES Civ. PRoc. (1957), effective July 1, 1957. On
the other hand, there seem to be definite signs of retrogression in the tentative prac-
tice code recommended for New York in 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION
ON THE COURTS, IIl, First Preliminary Report of the Advisor), Conmmittce on Practice
and Procedure, McKinney's 1957 Session Laws of New York, pp. A-335--A-461.
7 Morgan, Simplifying Present Alabama Procedure by Pouring Old Wine into
Fewer Bottles, 9 AtA. L. REv. 1 (1956).
8 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS AT WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 39-46; PROCEEDINGS AT CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 221-
224.
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be too often emphasized. This is no attempt to reject the
wisdom and experience that lawyers have acquired over the cen-
turies. Rather it is a plan to build and make use of it. As I
point out below, some of the best of common law pleading is
preserved and utilized. The result is that the lawyers utilize
the principle of the popular song, "Doing What Comes Nat-
urally."
I would illustrate this important and sometimes overlooked
feature of the rules by an example from the heart of the system,
the requirement in the complaint of "a short and plain state-
ient of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
used instead of the older code expression of "a plain and con-
cise statement of the facts constituting each cause of action with-
out unnecessary repetition."9 Although case after case has now
demonstrated the smooth and natural working of this new rule,
yet its purpose and effect were for a time rather surprisingly
overlooked. Thus it was not too well noted that the idea behind
both the code and modern expressions, illustrated by the em-
phasis on the short, the plain, and the concise, was essentially
the same. It was to get the story of the occasion for the action
before the court quickly and simply. Some lawyers became
fearful when they thought they saw no emphasis on "facts"-a
term actually of great complexity, although often thought to be
simple. Their fears were accentuated by the banners carried by
enthusiasts for "notice pleading," so called-a concept even
more indefinite than "facts" and never employed in the rules
or notes of the Federal Advisory Committee. The obvious con-
cern of lawyers lest the development of all issues prior to trial
was to be foregone, and no case no matter how worthless could
be exposed without complete and expensive trial, was such that
the Advisory Committee took note of it. In the somewhat un-
usual step-in its recent proposed Amendments-of a Commit-
tee Note to a Rule to which it proposed no amendment, it
carefully defined the present objective and pointed out its dis-
similarity from any system of mere notice and its similarity to
the code principles. This clear statement seems to have been
completely satisfactory; and the anxiety, it is believed, has now
been dispelled.1"
9 Compare F.R. 8 (a) and Ala. Rule 8 (a) with, e.g., N.Y. CODE CIv. PROC. § 481
and N.Y. Civ. Pinto. AcT § 255; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 210-215, 225-245 (2d ed. 1947).
10 Advisory Committee Note to F.R. 8(a), REPORT OF PROPOSED AmENDmNTS, OC-
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This brief contretemps does, however, indicate the possi-
bility of misunderstanding when the reasons for rejection of an
older principle, desirable in theory, but unsuccessful in prac-
tice, are not understood. If, as is clear, the need that the pleader
tell the story of the legal dispute leading to the lawsuit is still
accepted, why abandon the old verbal formula embodying the
principle? The answer is that the old formula has acquired too
many barnacles hiding the principle itself, so that the concise
story is too often lost and elaboration of detail is made para-
mount. True, there were many enlightened decisions of old
from great states like Minnesota and California where fact
pleading did observe the code ideal of directness and concise-
ness. But unfortunately by a kind of Gresham's law in plead-
ing,": the technical decision survives to drive out the flexible
and useful; there is more to talk about in a harsh ruling and it
makes more noise and for a longer time than does a permissive
ruling. So the decisions requiring absurd details piled up and
the shadowboxing of preliminary rulings on demurrers or mo-
tions proliferated. Particularly in the mother state of New York
did confusion reign and technicality become exalted. 12 A sound
remedy seemed to be to free the pleadings from all this outworn
learning and pseudo legalism by (1) substituting a new general
formula-the one above quoted-and (2) giving illustrations
of the meaning by selected forms. This is what was done in the
new rules.
The illustrative forms are thus of the utmost importance;
they show "the simplicity and brevity of statement which the
rules contemplate."'13 It is interesting that these forms come in
straight line of descent from the common law. Thus your pro-
posed Forms 11-19, following Federal Forms 4-8, are from gen-
eral assumpsit and the common counts. They well might seem
tober 1955, 18, 19. For the previous discussion see Claim or Cause of Action, 13
F.R.D. 253-279; McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading, 38 A.B.A.J. 123
(1952); Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact Pleading,
13 LA. L. REv. 395 (1953); McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana,
13 LA. L. REv. 369 (1953).
11Discussed in Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural
Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 498 (1950), and see Clark, "Clarifying" Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules? 14 OHIO ST. L. J. 241, 245 (1953) ; Wright, Amendments
to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 521, 522 (1954).
12 Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1194 (1955);
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 225-238 (2d ed. 1947); and see notes 6 supra and 36 infra.
13 F.R. 84; Ala. Rule 84.
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strange to a layman or a lawyer lacking historical knowledge,
but to the educated lawyer they are old friends. 4 So Form 26,
identical with Federal Form 9, a complaint for negligence in
the operation of an automobile, is straight from Chitty and tres-
pass on the case by way, incidentally, of a Massachusetts statute
of model forms.15 I cannot too strongly emphasize again that
the rules build on the knowledge of the past; there is no intent
to burn the old legal books, only to use them as they constitute
the heritage of all educated lawyers. And this illustrates what
is sometimes overlooked; namely, that both common law and
equity pleading had their simple features. Unfortunately this
simplicity had been allowed to be overwhelmed by detail; now
we have a return to the former ease. The dichotomy is more
one between "general" and "special" pleading, with renewed
emphasis on the former, than between the old and the new.'6
In stressing this approach of the rules to pleading funda-
mentals I have a small bone to pick with one of the generally
exemplary "Commission Notes" to your Rules. This desire to
view a reform as a wholly new step has permeated even these
notes so that in the discussion under the crucial Rule 8 of Gen-
eral Rules of Pleading17 there is some talk of "giving notice"
and so on, which I find unenlightening, if not confusing, for
the reasons stated above. Indeed, it almost seems that notes
2 and 3 war with each other. Thus note 3 properly deduces
from the forms and the interrelated rules that Rule 8 "en-
visages the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events
in support of the claim presented"; and note 2 quotes from
an opinion I wrote suggesting to the pleader that for clar-
ity and safety he give a "simple statement in sequence of
the events which have transpired, coupled with a direct claim
by way of demand for judgment of what the plaintiff expects
and hopes to recover."' But then in going back to "fair notice"
the Note says, "The common law concept of pleading to an
14 Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. or CHI. L. REv. 233, 245 (1937);
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 287-296 (2d ed. 1947); 30 CALIF. L. RE v. 585 (1942); 4 id. 352
(1916).
15 From MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 231, § 147, r. 2892 (1932), and see Williams v. Hol-
land, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (C.P. 1833); Reichwein v. United Electric Rys.,
68 R.I. 365, 27 A.2d 845 (1942), quoting the declaration in 2 Cn-Vr,, PLEADING 574
(16th Am. ed.).
16 See discussions cited in note 8 supra and CLARK, CODE PLEADING 13 (2d ed. 1947).
17 Commission Notes, FINAL DRAFT ALA. RULES CIV. PROC. 52 (1957).
1s Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1945); see also
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1955, per Harlan, J.).
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issue is completely abandoned." How can this be when in the
forms the issues are stated just as they were in trespass on the
case and general assumpsit? Certainly issues are still framed,
though they are now broad and general and the penalties for
mistakes are not made severe under the policy of free amend-
ment and trial of issues by implied consent. Moreover, I
suspect we often forget how much information general plead-
ing does give us. Consider the famous Form 9 cited above ap-
pearing as Form 26 of the Alabama Rules; it pins down the
automobile accident to one occurrence of a described kind-
there a street crossing accident between pedestrian and auto-
mobile; any more detail, if wrung from the parties in battles
of motions or demurrers, would at best be superfluous at that
stage and might unfairly restrict the proof as the evidence de-
veloped naturally at trial.
Such a system works well because it is natural to lawyers.
It expects the lawyers to tell in advance what they are accus-
tomed to disclose; thus it does not press for the impossible, con-
tested, or feared disclosure; nor does it contemplate that the
court will then spend time polishing or perfecting the results
achieved in natural course. For it turns to another series of
devices to fill in the gaps and provide that information neces-
sary for a speedy trial or a negotiation for settlement. Foolish
and unnecessary trials made possible by concealment should be
avoided; the ancient demurrer sought a worthy objective, but
could rarely succeed because true and lasting disclosure cannot
be obtained from the formalized pleadings of shrewd lawyers.
So the modern discovery devices are a necessary part of the
workable scheme. This includes all the famous discovery pro-
visions, including interrogatories, depositions, written admis-
sions, and so on; 19 it also includes the collateral steps of sum-
mary judgment on motion and of pre-trial to develop the issues,
indeed the true case in advance of trial.20 Gone is the bogey of
concealment and the surprise attack. "Ye shall know the truth,
and the truth shall make you free" is demonstrated over and over
X1 F.R. 26-35; Ala. Rules 26-35. For a full statement of the actual operation of
discovery in practice, see Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts,
60 YALE L. J. 1132 (1951); and see also Wright, Wegner & Richardson, The Prac.
ticing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97.
20 F.R. and Ala. Rule 56; F.R. and Ala. Rule 16. See Clark, The Summary Judg-
ment, 86 MINN. L. R . 567 (1952), and Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17
OHIO ST. L. J. 163 (1956).
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today in our courts under modern practice. Perhaps once in a
while the delights of a surprise victory via sudden attack must be
foregone; against this is a gain in the sure knowledge obtained
in preparation and the resultant understanding of "how much
a case is worth" to press forward. Naturally the wise attorneys
reach agreement in most cases, except those which may require
court settlement of purely novel points; and the court, the com-
munity, and the parties profit. So do the lawyers; the cases
which otherwise would have lain long in the lawyers' "morgue"
for lack of promise-while litigants worried and fumed-are.
now brought out, dusted over, and adjusted at true worth. No
wonder the court administrators of crowded calendars are en-
thusiastic about the successes of pre-trial in elimination of cal-
endar congestion.2' Here is not just- a trick device. It is the
final or next to the final step in a soundly reasoned and de-
veloped system of practice. That system you have prepared and
at hand before you for your adoption; my only admonition is
that you grasp it and reap its advantages.
There is one additional feature I should stress. I have em-
phasized the pragmatic qualities of the system and how it is at
once keyed to the lawyers' habits and the needs of courts and
litigants. But we all know that any practice tends to harden
and become rigid.2 2 Even necessary red tape-the normal rou-
tine of business, industry, or government-becomes oppressive
when it is too obtrusive. The remedy is to reassess it constantly,
to lop off the unnecessary, and to sharpen the parts which are
working. Some system of amending the rules is a vital neces-
sity. And that the federal experience has demonstrated by a
limited, though necessary, number of amendments.2 3
;1 Among the many able demonstrations of pre-trial in print, those of Mr. Justice
Brennan with his former associates from New Jersey are particularly persuasive. See
Brennan, Pretrial Procedure in New Jersey-a Demonstration, 28 N.Y. ST. B. BULL.
442 (1956); Brennan, Remarks on Pre-Trial, 17 F.R.D. 479 (1955); and Brennan,
New Jersey Tackles Court Congestion, 40 J. Am. Jum. Soc'Y 45 (1956).
22 "One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems which a
legal system must face is a combination of a due regard for the claims of substantial
justice with a system of procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy to favour
one quality at the expense of the other, with the result that either all system is lost,
or there is so elaborate and technical a system that the decision of cases turns almost
entirely upon the working of its rules and only occasionally and incidentally upon
the merits of the cases themselves." 2 HoLI.swoRTH, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 251
(4th ed. 1936).
23 There have been amendments on four occasions, only once involving revisions
of substantial extent. See Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? 14
Onio ST. L. J. 241, 242 (1953).
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But here we must face a problem made immediate by the
Supreme Court's recent discharge of its Advisory Committee on
the civil rules, 2 accompanied by the Court's failure to take ac-
tion on pending amendments.5 This is something of a paradox.
When the success of the federal rules-actually enacted by the
Supreme Court, even though prepared by its Committee-is at
its very summit, when the Court is receiving plaudits for its
accomplishment, the Court in effect abandons its success and
discards its role of leadership.2 6 I would be wanting in frank-
ness did I not express my shock and regret, shared, I believe,
by all protagonists of court reform, at this heavy loss-one
which may cause the federal system to be henceforth somewhat
of a blanket to state reforms. But I think we should seek to
understand the Court's problem and to take heed for a wise
future course in federal and state practice both, rather than
yield to unconstructive criticism. Since the Court does not ex-
plain its reasons, we cannot speak with definitive knowledge.
Nevertheless natural deductions do not seem hard to make.
Starting with Justice Brandeis' original objections, based on
the proper function of the Court, rather than objections to the
rules themselves, s we know that certain justices have felt rule-
making an undesirable, if not impracticable, job for the Court.29
Recent developments, high regard for the existing rules, doubt
of the present need for change,O and a recoiling from the sharp
24 352 U.S. 803 (1956), terminating the appointment of the Committee made in
295 U.S. 774 (1935) and revoking the order for its continuance in 314 U.S. 720 (1942).
25 The REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS cited in note 10 supra was submitted to
the Court on October 1, 1955, but no action with regard to it has been announced.
26 There seems a touch of irony, obviously unintended, in the encomia of Holtz-
off, Judicial Procedure Reform: The Leadership of the Supreme Court, 43 A.B.A.J.
215 (1957), and the editorial, Brilliant Leadership, 43 A.B.A.J. 240, 241 (1957).
27 The Supreme Court is doubtless unaware of the movements in the states, such
as Alabama, for reform along federal lines; but at any rate its present membership
obviously does not desire the role of leadership as described in the articles cited in
note 26 supra.
28 In correspondence after his retirement, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that his
objections to the adoption of the rules, 302 U.S. 783 (1937), did not imply disapproval
of their adoption in the states. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 37 (2d ed. 1947).
29 See dissent on the exercise of the rule-making power by Mr. Justice Black, 307
U.S. 652 (1939), 308 U.S. 642, 643 (1939), 323 U.S. 821 (1944), and dissent or quali-
fied concurrence by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 323 U.S. 821 (1944) and 329 U.S. 843
(1946). Compare critical comments in 31 A.B.A.J. 136, 163 (1945) and by Cummings,
31 A.BA.J. 236, 238 (1945), and Dession, 55 YAIE L. J. 694, 698 (1946); and see also
Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAw & CONTEMPI. PROB. 144,
148-149 (19480; Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules
Committee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521 (1942); and the resolution of the American Bar Associa-
tion, 28 A.B.A.J. 711, 67 A.B.A. REP. 131 (1942).
30 Here, too, it is to be feared that the Court will lack knowledge of particular
defects in the general success of the system; thus the rule for substitution of parties,
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division of view between lawyers favoring and lawyers opposed
to narrowing the reach of discovery3 1 -all these have undoubt-
edly led it to retreat as far as it feels it can from the heat of
debate and controversy. We can surely sympathize, but we can
hardly promise more quietude. For the discovery controversy
was obviously a sign of the strong, vital, and challenging in-
terest of lawyers active in litigation. We should not stop or
lessen this if we would. Perhaps then we need to consider other
ways and means; the suggestion that the Judicial Conference
of the United States succeed to the Court's rule-making func-
tion as least merits debate and discussion -.3  All of us will regret
the loss of the prestige and persuasive effect of the Court's
leadership; but we can hardly expect results worthy of the cause
if the Court itself does not believe in its own function as de-
fined by Congress.
This problem must be faced in a state; it must be faced
in Alabama. The usual solution has been to leave the final
authority with the highest court of the state, but with a rules
committee or commission permanently in action.3 3 This I think
desirable. The Federal Advisory Committee was not recog-
nized in any law; it was only a creature of the Court serving at
will as adviser merely. This had some disadvantages; thus it had
no authority to protect in any way what it had done.34 It was at
the mercy of any case which might bring in question the mean-
ing and even validity of any of its rules. The Attorney General
Rule 25, was left without adequate support of legislation by an unfortunate, if com-
plimentary, turn of events, see note 37 infra, and the correcting amendments of
RrPoRT, October 1955, 28-33, not having been adopted, see notes 10, 25 supra, the
rule has been held invalid as a limitations, leaving a serious gap. Perry v. Allen, 239
F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
31 The debate over discovery, sparked by NACCA on the one hand and the In-
ternational Association of Insurance Counsel on the other, concerned the extension
of Rules 33 and 34, dealing with written interrogatories and documents for inspec-
tion, i.e., details in the broad picture of the general system.
32 The suggestion for authority in a body such as the Judicial Conference of the
United States, made from time to time in the past, Louisell, Book Review, 66 YALE
L. J. 164, 166 (1956); Shaw, Procedural Reform and the Rule Making Power in New
York, 24 Form. L. REv. 338 (1955), has been given increased momentum by the reso-
lution authorizing the appointment of a Study Committee to explore the whole sub-
ject of rule-making, adopted by the Conference at its session March 14, 15, 1957.
33VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIINISTRATION 128-131 (1949),.
and see note 32 supra.
31 Examples of need to redirect or clarify existing rules appear as described in
the notes to the REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, October 1955, cited notes 10, 25
supra, and in Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? 14 OHIO ST. L.
J. 241 (1953); see also Wright, Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending
the Federal Rules, 69 HARv. L. REv. 839 (1956); Wright, Amendments to the Federal
Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521 (1954).
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of the United States is by law required to watch over and de-
fend the validity of any Act of Congress; 33 but no one defends
the products of the Court itself, though studied, developed.
and advanced by its presumably expert advisers. This should
be changed. There should be a permanent body somewhere,
charged with continuous supervision of the practice and pro-
vided with counsel or other defenders of its basic principles.
Even as it was, the record achieved in the federal practice
of a rule-making system not subject to legislative whim was re-
markable. Before the federal rules legislative tinkering with
court procedure was a byword. It still is in states such as New
York.", But since 1937 it has been the steady habit of Congress
and its Committees to refer all requests or demands for change
to the Court or its committee and to refrain from interfering
itself.37 That is an outstanding show of confidence; its benefits
in keeping the procedure uniform and workable are immeas-
urable. The legal profession in Alabama should consider this
record and the utility of such a body. I hope then you will
consider the creation of a permanent commission-responsible
to your highest court if that court will willingly assume the
heavy responsibilities of leadership in practice reforms-to keep
the tools of law administration ever sharp and bright.
Although I have been in the midst of law reforms prac-
tically all my adult life I yet thrill at each new birth of spirit,
interest, and accomplishment as lawyers turn the keen minds
they have trained for the purpose to their highest objective-
"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion" in our courts.3 I count it a privilege that you have in-
vited me to share even in a small way in this glorious movement.
35 Act of Aug. 24, 1937, c. 754, § 1, 50 Stat. 751, now 28 U.S.C. § 2403.
30 See note 12 supra; also Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule.
Making Power: A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SY'RACUSE L. REv. 346 (1950); Mitchell,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in DAvm DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYs 73
(1949); Memorandum, 2 THE RECORD 12, 18 (1947); Keeffe, Brooks & Greer, New York.
Rule-Making Power. 86 or 1100, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 253 (1946).
37 It is noteworthy, indeed memorable, that in the two decades since the rules
have been in effect Congress has refrained from interfering with federal civil pro--
cedure in all but two instances, both comparatively minor and one obviously in-
advertent. In the Patent Act of 1952, there is a provision requiring special pleading
of certain defenses to a patent infringement suit, 35 U.S.C. § 282, and in the Code
Revision Act of 1948, it repealed the statutes for substitution of parties, the former
28 U.S.C. §§ 778 and 780, for the stated, but erroneous, reasons that they were super.
seded by Rules 25 and 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 30
supra and REPoRT oF PRoPosD AMENDMENTS, October 1955, 29-31.
38 F.R. and Ala. Rule 1.
